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I. Developments in Investor-State Arbitration
A. AWARDS ON THE MERITS-SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES
Relatively robust activity characterized the investor-state docket in 2005. Between De-
cember 2004 and November 2005, five awards on the merits were issued in Investor-State
treaty-based arbitrations: Petrobart Ltd. v. Republic of Kyrgyz, l Methanex Corp. v. United
States,2 Eureko B. V v. Poland,3 Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania,4 and CMS Gas Transmission
Co. v. Argentina.'
Petrobart Ltd. v. Republic of Kyrgyz concerned a contract for the supply of condensate gas
between Petrobart Limited, a company registered in Gibraltar, and Kyrgyzgasmunaizat
(KGM), a state joint stock company wholly-owned by the government of the Republic of
*Section I was contributed by C. Ignacio Suirez Anzorena, Special Counsel International Arbitration Group,
Clifford Chance LLP, London. Section IH was contributed by Robert Wisner, Counsel, Appleton & Associates
International Lawyers, Toronto. Professor Jack Coe, Jr of the Pepperdine Law Faculty provided editorial
assistance for Sections I and fI. Section I was contributed by Claudia T. Salomon and Kiera S. Gans. Ms.
Salomon is co-leader of DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP's international arbitration practice and is
based in the New York office. Ms. Gans is an associate in DLA Piper's New York office.
1. Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Republic, Arbitral Award Case No. 126/2003, Stockholm Chamber of Com-
merce Arbitration Inst. (Mar. 29, 2005), available at www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investsd-petrobart-kyrgyz.pdf.
The award was rendered under the Energy Charter Treaty and the arbitration proceedings were governed by
the rules of the Stockholm Arbitration Institute. The tribunal was composed of formerJustice Hans Denelaus,
Professor Ove Bring, and Mr. Jeroen Smets.
2. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award, NAFTA Trib. (Aug. 8, 2005), available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf. The tribunal was composed of Mr. J. William E Rowley,
QC; Professor W Michael Reisman; and VV. Veeder, QC.
3. Eureko B.V v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award (Aug. 19, 2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/doc-
uments/Eureko-PartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf. The tribunal was composed of Mr. L. Yves Fortier,
CC, QC; Judge Stephen M. Schwebel; and Professor Jerzy Rajsld.
4. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Republic of Romania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/I 1 (2005), available
at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf. The tribunal was composed of Professor Karl-Heinz B6ckstie-
gel; Sir Jeremy KCMG, QC; and Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy.
5. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/0l/8 (2005), available
at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CMS_-FinalAward.pdf.
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Kyrgyz. After KGM failed to pay certain invoices, Petrobart obtained a favorable ruling
from the local arbitration court. Execution of the award was stayed for three months, at
the request of Governmental authorities6 who, at a later stage, pursued a stabilization pro-
gram that rendered KGM insolvent by transferring its assets to other entities controlled by
the state. Petrobart claimed that the Kyrgyz authorities' interference in the court's pro-
ceedings, the stripping of KGM's assets, and other measures taken by the Republic of
Kyrgyz, breached the Energy Charter Treaty of 1998.1 Agreeing with the investor, the
tribunal awarded it US $1,130,859 (with interest), but declined to award compensation for
lost profits. The Republic of Kyrgyz has challenged the award before the Swedish courts.
Methanex Corp. v. United States arose from a change in California law that precluded sales
of gasoline containing the additive MTBE by the end of 2002. The measure was ostensibly
motivated by health and safety concerns. Methanex, a Canadian corporation, produces an
ingredient used to make MTBE. It brought a claim alleging that the ban on MTBE violated
NAFTA Chapter Eleven. It sought US $970 million in compensation. In August of 2005,
the Tribunal dismissed all of its claims. I
Eureko B. V v. Poland related to privatization of a state-owned insurance company and the
government's alleged failure to make a public offering that would have allowed Eureko B.V.
to take control of the company. In a partial award on liability, the Tribunal decided (with
one dissenting opinion)9 that Poland had breached BIT obligations.
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, brought under the U.S.-Romania BIT,10 concerned a
privatization agreement between a U.S. investor, Noble Ventures, Inc. (Noble), and the
Romanian Government, regarding a state-owned steel mill, CSR, and related assets. Noble
claimed that Romania misrepresented CSR's assets, failed to perform in good faith certain
contractual obligations, failed to provide full protection and security during a period of
labor unrest," and initiated insolvency proceedings to deprive Noble of the effective use of
its investment. The Tribunal found no treaty breaches and dismissed all of Noble's claims.
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina was the first decision on the merits in the many
claims arising out of Argentina's emergency measures following the financial crisis that
began in late 2001. CMS held a minority interest in Transportadora de Gas del Norte
(TGN), which was granted a license to transport gas for thirty-five years. TGN's license,
as well as laws, regulations, and the memorandum offering shares in TGN, said its tariffs
were to be calculated in U.S. dollars, converted to pesos at the time of billing and tariffs
would be adjusted every six months in accordance with U.S. inflation. CMS claimed at the
ICSID that Argentina's unilateral amendment of the form of the tariffs breached Argen-
6. The Tribunal made a specific reference to a Vice Prime Minister letter, asking the Court's Chairman to
"assist in granting a deferral of the enforcement." See Petrobart Ltd., Arbitral Award Case No. 126/2003, at 75.
7. See Energy Charter Treaty, European Energy Charter Conference, Dec. 20, 1993, available at http://
www.encharter.org. The Energy Charter Treaty was signed in Lisbon on December 17, 1994, and entered into
force in April 1998, following completion of the thirtieth ratification.
8. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
9. See Eureko B. V, Partial Award.
10. Romania Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Rom., May 23, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-37 (1994),
available at http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/htmlUS-ROM-BIT-1994-.htnl (treaty between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of Romania concerning the Reciprocal Encour-
agement and Protection of Investment of 28 May 1992).
11. Noble Ventures, Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 1 15.
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tina's obligations under the Argentina-U.S. BIT The ICSID Tribunal awarded CMS
US$133 million plus interest in damages.
B. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
To varying degrees and without full unity, the awards under consideration address the
content of the "fair and equitable treatment" obligation prevalent among BITS. Though
not accounting for all recent cases, two reasoning trends can be identified. The first is an
approach that focuses on the investor's expectations when making the investment.,2 The
award in Eureko B. V, for example, endorses the expectation-based approach by citing, with
approval, Tecmed v. Mexico 3 an award that elaborated upon the importance of an investor's
expectations.' 4
The second approach, associated in particular with the NAFTA cases, equates fair and
equitable treatment with customary international law's minimum standard, as dictated by
an interpretation issued by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) in 2001."1 While
legitimate expectations are relevant to this second approach, liability seems to depend on
the investor demonstrating a relatively high degree of arbitrariness or unreasonableness.1
In relation to fair and equitable treatment, Metbanex is noteworthy in at least two aspects.
First, it endorses the binding character of the controversial interpretation of 1105 NAFTA
issued by the FTC in 2001.11 Second, the Tribunal posited that discrimination between
nationals and aliens contravenes customary international law only by way of exception.
Accordingly, that the claimant had received treatment different from that of a national
12. See Ttcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/
2 (2003), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Tecnicas-Mexico-Award-29May2003-Eng.
pdf, see also MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd v. Republic of Chile, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/7 (2004), available
at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/MTD-Chile-Award-25May2004.pdf; seealso Occidental Explo-
ration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case no. UN3467 (2004), available at http://www.
investnentclaims.com/decisions/Occidenal-Ecuador-FinalAward-lJul 2004.pdf see also CMS Gas Transmis-
sion, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8.
13. See Tecmed, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2.
14. More recently, subsequent to the period covered by this report, the separate opinion in Thunderbird v.
Mexico provided a rich exploration of the role of investor expectations in relation to fair and equitable treatment.
See Thunderbird v. Mexico, NAFTA Ch 11, Award ofJanuary 26, 2006 (Sep. Op. of Thomas Waelde), available
at http://www.naftaclaims.com.
15. See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter I 1 Provisions, July
31, 2001, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp.
16. See Waste Mgmt. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3, 43 I.L.M. 967,
(2004), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/WasteMgmt-Mexico-2-FinalAward-3OApr204.
pdf. The tribunal did a thorough review of the existing international case law on this topic,
the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is infringed by conduct attributable
to the State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic,
is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due
process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety-as might be the case with a manifest
failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency and [candor) in any
administrative process.
For a similar approach, but in a case under an investment treaty, see Genin v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/99/2 (2001), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Genin-Estonia-
Award-25Jun2001.pdf.
17. See Metbanex, Final Award, NAFTA Trib., at part IV, chap. C, p. 9, 20.
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would not constitute a breach of the minimum standard unless claimant established that a
specific customary rule required equal treatment under the circumstances. 8 The tribunal
regarded the claimant's authority to be insufficient for that purpose.
Noble Ventures assessed the fair and equitable treatment provision in the governing BIT
as a matter of treaty construction. Based on the ordering of the clauses, the tribunal observed
that fair and equitable treatment might be viewed as a general duty composed of specific
obligations including: the duty to provide full protection and security, the prohibition of
arbitrary and discriminatory measures, and the obligation to observe contractual obligations
towards investors. 19 The more specific guarantees had not been violated. Though the tri-
bunal reasoned that, in theory, the lesser-included undertakings need not be breached for
there to have occurred an actionable lapse in fair and equitable treatment, the facts did not
establish such a breach in the case at hand, 20 in part because the state was responding to
dramatic economic conditions.2
The role of dramatic economic conditions was also considered by the CMS Gas Trans-
mission Co. v. Argentina Tribunal. While it found that none of Argentina's arguments
amounted to a complete defense of its actions, the Tribunal accepted that Argentina's eco-
nomic situation influenced the standard of treatment it could be expected to provide to
foreign investors. The Tribunal said "the Claimant cannot ask to be entirely beyond the
reach of the abnormal conditions prompted by the crisis, as this would be unrealistic."22
After expressing its willingness to adjust the standard of treatment to accommodate Ar-
gentina's changed circumstances, the CMS Gas Tribunal found that Argentina had still failed
to meet the standard of fair and equitable treatment. The license and legal framework
provided for both systematic and ad-hoc review of the tariffs to accommodate changing
costs and returns. As a result, the Tribunal found that Argentina's unilateral adjustment of
the nature of the tariffs, without using the mechanisms provided in the license and relevant
laws, breached both the fair and equitable treatment standard and the umbrella clause of
the BIT. The Tribunal drew from the treaty's objectives to conclude that "a stable legal
and business environment is an essential element" of the fair and equitable treatment
standard.23
The award in Petrobart Ltd. v. Republic of Kyrgyz is distinctive. The Tribunal reasoned
that despite the prevalence of fair and equitable treatment provisions within BITs, inter-
national law had developed no specific definition of that doctrine. Accordingly, the obli-
18. Id. 1 25. The tribunal wrote:
Customary international law has ... has decided that some differentiations are discriminatory. But the
International Court of Justice has held that "[tlhe Party which relies on a custom of this kind must
prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party"
Id. 26.
19. See Noble Ventures, Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/ 11, 182.
20. Id.
21. The Tribunal explicitly affirmed that its conclusion "is reinforced by the consideration that the Respon-
dent is not to be blamed for having violated any obligations under international law in connection with the
indisputable dramatic economic situation at the time." Id. It is interesting to contrast this approach with the
one adopted in CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina where the tribunal considered that the dramatic situation
in Argentina was relevant for purposes of assessing the damages but not as a matter of liability under the
standard under consideration.
22. CMS Gas Transmission, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, 1 244.
23. Id. 274.
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gation could be understood through standard rules of treaty interpretation that relied on
ordinary meaning. Against this standard, the acts and omissions of the host state, various
forms of interference with the investment, had fallen short.
C. UMBRELLA CLAUSES
2 4
Two recurrent questions are among those that characterize the emerging jurisprudence
concerning umbrella clauses: can an umbrella clause transform a contract breach into a
treaty breach;" and if it can, must the breach be of a particular character or magnitude to
engage the host state's responsibility? Two recent awards are among the available precedent
on these questions. Eureko B. V and Noble involved similarly worded umbrella clauses26 Con-
sistently with SGS v. Philippines"7 and thus somewhat at odds with SGS v. Pakistan,2 both
tribunals opined that such clauses encompassed at least certain contractual breaches by the
host state; and their umbrella clause analyses the awards appear to not distinguish among
types of contract breach. 29
24. See generally Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of tbe Umbrella Clause in the International Law ofInvestment
Protection, 20 Arb. Int'l 411 (2004); Emmanuel Gaillard, Investment Treaty Arbitration and J]urisdiction Over
Contract Claims, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID,
NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 325 (Todd Weiler ed. 2005) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW).
25. See SGS Socibt6 Gtn&ale de Surveillance S.A.v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13 (2003), available
at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SGSvPalistan-decision_000.pdf (where the tribunal adopted a negative
view); contra SGS Socibt6 Gbntrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (2004),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SGSvPhil-final-OOI.pdf (where the tribunal reached the opposite
conclusion).
26. See Romania Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 10, at art. 11.2(c) ("Each Party shall observe any
obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments."); see also Agreement on Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Neth.-Pol., art. 3(5), available at http://145.69.44.61/beleid/home-ond/
buithandmissie/ibo/ibopolen.pdf.
27. ICSID Case No. ARB/ 02 / 6, 19 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. Cl (Feb. 2004). For the SGS v Pakistan
tribunal, it was essential, however, that the party relying on the clause demonstrates that the treaty parties
shared an intention to catch such breaches. In the case there at hand, that intention had not been demonstrated.
See Gaillard, supra note 24, at 339-40. Some tribunals, though regarding the umbrella clause as embracing
contract breaches, may decline to exercise jurisdiction where the contract has a forum selection clause that
names a domestic court.
28. ICSID Case No. ARB/ 01/13, 18 ICSID Rev. 307 (2003); 42 I.L.M. 1290 (2003). For the SGSv Pakistan
tribunal, it was controlling that the party relying on the clause had not demonstrated that the treaty parties
shared an intention to catch such breaches. The tribunal did not question that states may through treaty agree
that breaches of state contracts with investors are also treaty breaches. See Gaillard, supra note 24, at 339-40.
Some tribunals, though regarding the umbrella clause as embracing contract breaches, may decline to exercise
jurisdiction where the contract in question has a forum selection clause that names a domestic court. See id. at
242-343.
29. In Eureko B. V v. Poland such an inference can be drawn from the citations of authors supporting the
position that mere contractual breaches can imply a breach of an umbrella clause and from the assertion by
the tribunal that Poland's breach of its contractual arrangements does not qualify as a breach of the fair and
equitable standard or the expropriation provision, but it may imply a transgression of the umbrella clause. See
Eureko B. V, Partial Award, 11 250-51. A strong dissent lamented the majority's failure to examine the law
governing the contract in question, and raised other issues. See Eureko B. V, Partial Award (Dissenting Opinion
of Mr. Jerzy Rajski).
In Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, the Tribunal refrained from expressing a definitive conclusion as to the
type of breaches and obligations that might create liability under an umbrella clause, given that such a distinction
would not affect its ultimate conclusions on liability. But it decided to proceed on the basis that a breach of
contract constituted a breach of a BIT. See Noble Ventures, Inc., ICSID (W'. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/I 1, 61.
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D. EXPROPRIATION
Although succinct on the subject, the award in Petrobart Ltd. v. Republic of Kyrgyz found
a lack of indirect expropriation based upon reasoning out of step with prevailing doctrine.30
The Tribunal noted that the measures did not appear to be directed specifically to the
claimant, or have the aim of transferring economic value from Petrobart to the Kyrgyz
Republic. Neither predicate, however, is insisted upon by most commentators and
tribunals."
Controversial doctrine was also set forth in the Metbanex award, when it observed that
as a matter of general international law:
a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due
process and, which effects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expro-
priatory unless specific commitments have been given by the regulating government to the
then putative foreign investors contemplating investment that the government would refrain
from such regulation. 2
Critics of the Methanex Corp. expropriation obiter consider it unduly restrictive. The
tribunal relied for authority upon an award issued in an Oversees Private Investment Cor-
poration insurance arbitration and upon portions of the Waste Management 133 award
devoted to the international minimum standard, as distinct from analysis directed to
NAFTA's expropriation provision. The Tribunal's pre-investment promise scenario is a
good example of indirect taking arising from regulation. The tribunal's apparent view that
the fact pattern mentioned exhausts those in which a taking can be found when non-
discriminatory regulation is involved. 4 seems to oversimplify the far from cohesive authority
addressing regulatory takings."
Though the NAFTA text involved in Methanex differs from the latest Model BITs pub-
lished by the U.S. and Canada, the Metbanex expropriation dictum is concordant with those
texts. In particular, both models contains language suggesting that general measures de-
signed to protect legitimate public welfare objectives are only rarely compensable; they also
enumerate factors that bear on the existence of an indirect taking) 6 In combination,
30. It is clear that there was no formal expropriation of Petrobart's investment. Nor does it appear that the
measures taken by the Kyrgyz Government and state authorities, although they had negative effects for Petro-
bart, were directed specifically against Petrobart's investment or had the aim of transferring economic values
from Petrobart to the Kyrgyz Republic. Petrobart's claims against KGM remained and gave rise to demands
in KGM's bankruptcy. The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the measures taken by the Kyrgyz Republic, while
disregarding Petrobart's legitimate interests as an investor, did not attain the level ofdefacto expropriation. The
Arbitral Tribunal therefore concludes that the Republic's action does not fall within [airticle 13(l) ofthe Treaty.
Petrobart Ltd., Arbitral Award Case No. 126/2003, at 77.
31. See generally George Aldrich, Wat Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, 88 Am. J INrT'L LAw 585 (1994).
32. Metbanex, Final Award, NAFTA Trib., at part IV, chap. D, p. 4, 7.
33. Id. 7-8 (citing Waste Management, 43 I.L.M. 967, 11).
34. Id. TT 7, 10.
35. See generally Jack J. Coe, Jr. & Noah Rubins, Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case: Context and
Contributions, in INTERNATIONAL INVEsTMENT LAw, supra note 24.
36. See 2004 Model BIT, Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of (Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, available at
www.ustr.gov/assets/Zrade_-Sectors/Investment/Model-BIT/asset.upload-file847-6897.pdf. According toannex
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these guides are intended to bring structure and discipline to claims of regulatory taking.
The extent to which they codify custom is subject to debate however."
Eureko B. V is distinctive in that the Tribunal concluded that a failure to make a public
offering in breach of a promise to do so may be tantamount to a deprivation of an asset
thus requiring compensation.38 By contrast, drawing on factual parallels to the ELSI case,3 9
the Noble Ventures tribunal declined to find certain judicial measures expropriatory, in part
because the investor's enterprise was insolvent. °
The CMS Gas Tribunal also rejected an expropriation claim. The Tribunal found that
Argentina had not substantially deprived CMS of the enjoyment of its investment because
CMS still owned and controlled the company.41 The Tribunal's decision on this point,
however, does not fully address the argument that a contract right may be expropriated
without the entire business being expropriated. CMS argued that Argentina's measures
expropriated its right to a tariff in U.S. dollars, adjusted for inflation which was another
type of investment protected by the BIT.42 The Tribunal did not rule on this issue at all.
II. Jurisdictional Requirements in Investor-State Arbitration
Arbitration tribunals established under investment treaties, like all international tribunals,
have jurisdiction limited to a specific subject matter (jurisdiction res materiae), to specific
persons or entities (jurisdiction res personae), and to specific timing of events (jurisdiction
res temporis). Jurisdictional objections are raised in the majority of treaty-based arbitrations.
Consistent with this tendency, 2005 witnessed a number of important decisions on all three
dimensions of jurisdiction.
B of the U.S. Model BIT 2004 (transferring the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court on national consti-
tutional law to customary international law), the ordinary meaning of indirect expropriation is:
(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation,
constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among
other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or series of actions
by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not
establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed
expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.
(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environ-
ment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.
37. See generally Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face ofinvestment Arbitration: NAFTA
Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (2003); David Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From
NAFTA to the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L.R. 679 (2004); Barton Legum
Lessons Learned from the NAFTA: The New Generation of US. Investment Treaty Arbitration Provisions, 19 ICSID
Rev. 344 (2004); JackJ. Coe Jr., The State of Investor-State Arbitration-Some Reflections on Professor Brower'sSearch
for Sensible Principles, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 931 (2005).
38. See Eureko B.V, Partial Award, 238-43.
39. Case Concerning Fettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy) 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
40. See Noble Ventures, Inc., ICSID (W Bank) Case No. ARB/01/11, 211-16.
41. CMS Gas Transmission, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, 263.
42. Id. 1 256.
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A. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
As noted above, in August of 2005 the Metbanex tribunal issued its final award, 43 dis-
missing the investor's claims and awarding costs to the United States. Both the structure
of the final award and the theories of recovery ultimately sponsored by the claimant, how-
ever, were prefigured by a pivotal jurisdictional ruling issued by the tribunal in August
2002." Based on the phrasing of NAFTA Article 1101 it reasoned that jurisdiction under
Chapter Eleven existed only when the measure complained of "related to" the investment
or the investor. The result is a legal proximity test. Because Methanex's product was an
ingredient in MTBE, and not MTBE itself, it faced a remoteness problem under the tri-
bunal's construction of Article 1101. Methanex's claim would be well-founded only if the
complained of measures were shown to directly target or contemplate the investor or its
enterprise. Merely demonstrating a negative effect on the investment would not suffice
where that effect was simply a consequence of regulation directed to an end-user of the
investor's product.41
In its reformulated claim Methanex asserted that the measure complained of was an
attempt by California's governor to reward claimant's competitors (makers of ethanol) for
their political support.4" The tribunal remained unconvinced. 47 Claimant's theory of the
case depended on inferences the tribunal deemed unwarranted given the more plausible
and legitimate public health reasons for the regulation in question."
In 2005, the surfeit of claims arising from Argentina's economic crisis of 2000 and as-
sociated emergency measures continued to produce jurisdictional rulings. In Camuzzi In-
ternational S.A. v. Argentina (Camuzzi ),49 Sempra Energy International v. Argentina,50 and
AES Corp. v. Argentina,51 the Tribunals took jurisdiction despite forum clauses in the con-
tracts designating Argentine courts. AES and Gas Natural SDG, examined ICSID's Article
25 jurisdictional conditions-a "legal" dispute that arises directly out of an investment,5 2
conditions found to be present despite the generalized nature of the economic emergency.
43. Metbanex, Final Award, NAFTA Trib.
44. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Partial Award, NAFTA Trib. (Aug. 7, 2002), available at. http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/l 2613 .pdf.
45. Id. 950.
46. Metbanex, Final Award, NAFTA Trib., '9 30-38.
47. In light of the tribunal's interpretation of article 1101's "relating to" phraseology, the claimant had to
demonstrate that it or its investment was targeted and thus not too remotely associated with the regulation in
question; the claimant thus was not entitled to fashion in the normal way claims for sub-standard treaunent
under article 1105, or discriminatory treatment under articles 1102 and 1103, which theories would not or-
dinarily depend on governmental animus or intent to harm.
48. Methanex, Final Award, NAFTA Trib., at part I1, ch. B, 9J 1-60. "There is ample evidence ... that
leaking [underground storage tanks] and water contamination were perceived as a serious and urgent problem
by the California Government, as well as by the California public at large." Id. ' 9.
49. Camuzzi Int'l S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/2 (2005), available at http://www.
investmentclaims.com/decisions/Camuzzi-Argentina-Jurisdiction- 1 lMay2005.pdf.
50. Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (2005), available at http://
www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Sempra-Argentina-Jurisdiction-I lMay2005.pdf.
51. AES Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, 95-99 (2005), available at http://
ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AES-Argentina-Jurisdiction 000.pdf.
52. Id. 47; Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, 22 (2005),
available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Gas%20Natural% 20SDG%20-%20Jurisdiction.pdf;
AES Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, 1 56; Gas Natural SDG, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, 21.
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Not all tribunals accepted jurisdiction however. Two tribunals rejected arguments that
claimants could broaden the tribunals' jurisdiction through Most Favored Nation (MFN)
clauses. In Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria," the Tribunal rejected the claimant's argu-
ment that it could use the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT's MFN clause to add ICSID to the in-
vestor's arbitration options, even though other Bulgarian BITs, unlike the one at hand,
afforded investors an ICSID arbitration alternative.
A similar kind of MFN borrowing was attempted by the claimant in Impregilo v. Pakistan."4
Its claims were largely based on the Pakistan water authority's failure to perform its con-
tractual obligations. There is no obligation observance or umbrella clause in the Italy-
Pakistan BIT that might oblige Pakistan to observe its contractual obligations. Based on
the Italy-Pakistan BIT's MFN clause, Impregilo invoked an obligations observance clause
in another BIT to which Pakistan is a party. Relying on a narrow reading of the BIT with
Italy, the tribunal rejected Impreglio's MFN theory because the Pakistan water authority
was not a "Contracting Party" to the BIT containing the MFN provision."
The Impregilo Tribunal did, however, accept jurisdiction to hear other claims including
that Pakistan breached fair and equitable treatment and expropriation undertakings. Paki-
stan was, in the process, largely unsuccessful in convincing the tribunal that the claims in
question were merely alleged contract breaches adorned as treaty violations1 6 Impregilo
had pointed to an exercise of sovereign authority in Pakistan's impugned acts sufficient to
establish the Tribunal's jurisdiction."
In Plama Consortium the host state unsuccessfully argued that Plama had no investment,
as required by both the investment treaty and the ICSID Convention. The putative in-
vestment was nevertheless ruled sufficient even though there was ongoing litigation in
Bulgaria over whether Plama owned the shares in question and even though Bulgaria alleged
that because of investor misrepresentations its share purchase was null and void. In retaining
jurisdiction, the Tribunal noted the treaty's wide definition of "investment," which included
"any right conferred by law or contract," a definition "[that ... would be satisfied by a
contractual or property right even if it were defeasible." 8 Furthermore, because Plama
claimed it was the true owner of the shares, it would be premature to accept Bulgaria's
characterization at the jurisdictional phase, 9 particularly given the belatedness of Bulgaria's
objection.60 Finally, the Tribunal found that the dispute settlement provisions in the treaty
were autonomous "so even if the parties' [share purchase] agreement... is arguably invalid
... the agreement to arbitrate remains effective."61
B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Claimants against Argentina also satisfied personal jurisdiction requirements in several
cases. In Camuzzi I and Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, the tribunals upheld the
53. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 (2005), available athttp://
www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Plama-Bulgaria-Jurisdiction-8Feb2005.pdf.
54. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3 (2005), available at http://
www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Impregilo-Pakistan-Jurisdiction-22Apr2005.pdf.
55. Id. 9J 223.
56. Id. IT 268, 282.
57. Id. 264-66.
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investors' ability to claim for indirect damages suffered directly by an Argentine company
in which they held shares. The Plama tribunal also resisted Bulgaria's theory that the claims
were caught by its notice under the Energy Charter Treaty purporting to exclude certain
classes of disputes from investor-state arbitration.62 Reacting to the timing of the notice the
Tribunal ruled that such a notice could have prospective effect only, and thus did not en-
compass the claims in question. Otherwise Bulgaria would be allowed "[to be the] judge in
its own cause.
63
In Impregilo v. Pakistan, the Tribunal addressed the standing of a joint venture and the
parties to the joint venture. The Tribunal upheld the claimant's right to claim indirect
damages suffered by the joint venture, though claimant had no right to claim on behalf of
the other parties to the venture or the joint venture itself.-
C. TEMPORAL JURISDICTION
Argentina's admissibility and objections ratione temporis were also unsuccessful in the
main. In both Camuzzi 1165 and Gas Natural,6 the claimants applied MFN clauses to over-
come a species of exhaustion requirement that would delay arbitral proceedings eighteen
months. The claimants successfully invoked certain of the respondent's other treaties to
side-step the eighteen month resort to domestic courts.67 Similarly, in AES, the tribunal
rejected Argentina's argument that the claim was not ripe because ongoing negotiations
rendered the final amount of damages unknown.- The treaty contained no exhaustion of
local negotiations requirement, only one requiring that the investor wait six months before
filing the claim.69 With regard to damages, the Tribunal opined that the claimant did not
have to prove it suffered a loss from the state's measures until the merits stage.70
Claimants against other states were not as successful in establishing temporal jurisdiction.
The Luchetti v. Peru Tribunal found it lacked jurisdiction based on a BIT clause limiting
claims to disputes beginning after the treaty came into force." In response to the Respon-
dent's jurisdictional challenge, the Claimants accepted that there was a dispute before the
treaty came into force, but argued that its claim arose out of separate acts giving rise to a
new dispute arising after the BIT came into force. In determining whether the second
dispute was a new dispute, the Tribunal asked if "the facts or considerations that gave rise
62. See Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 7. Article 17 states that
[e]ach Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the advantages of this Part to: (1) a legal entity if
citizens or nationals of a third state own or control such entity and if that entity has no substantial
business activities in the Area of the Contracting Party in which it is organized ....
Id. at art. 17.
63. Plama, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/24, 9 149.
64. Impregilo, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/3, 99 136-66.
65. Camuzzi, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/2.
66. Gas Natural SDG, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10.
67. Camuzzi, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/2, 9 28; Gas Natural SDG, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10,
9191 29-30.
68. AES Corp., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/17, 991 68-73.
69. Id. 9 68-71.
70. Id. 99 72-73.
71. Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Luccetti Peru, S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/
03/4 (2005), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Luchetti-Peru-Award-7Feb2005.pdf.
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to the earlier dispute continued to be central to the later dispute,"72 or if the disputes had
the same "origin or source." 3 The Tribunal found that the earlier facts were central to the
later dispute and that the disputes did have the same origin because the reasons for the later
revocation were directly related to the considerations that gave rise to the initial dispute.74
The Impregilo v. Pakistan Tribunal also considered an investor's ability to base a claim on
events occurring before the treaty came into force. Unlike the Chile-Peru BIT considered
in Lucchetti v. Peru, the Italy-Pakistan BIT before the Impregilo Tribunal did not contain an
express prohibition on claims arising from disputes occurring before the treaty came into
force. Qualifying the customary rule that a state cannot breach a treaty through acts oc-
curring before the treaty comes into force, the tribunal accepted that it had would have
temporal jurisdiction over pre-treaty acts that continued past that effective date of the treaty.
The principle, nevertheless, could not be the basis of jurisdiction in the case at hand, because
no such continuation in the complained of acts had been established."
H. New York Courts May Issue Provisional Remedies in
Aid of International Arbitration
On October 4, 2005, New York Governor George Pataki signed bill number 4837,
amending New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) section 7502(c), to enable New
York courts to issue provisional remedies in connection with international arbitrations. The
amendment brings New York law into conformity with the laws of other states, the laws of
other countries, and the rules of several international and national arbitration organizations,
and enhances New York's ability to promote itself as an ideal forum for the resolution of
international arbitrations. Since 1985, CPLR section 7502(c) has empowered New York
courts to entertain applications either for orders of attachment or preliminary injunctions
in connection "[with] an arbitrable controversy."7 6 Specifically, CPLR section 7502(c) em-
powers courts to grant such applications where the ultimate award "may be rendered in-
effectual without such provisional relief."77 Until recently, however, New York courts in-
terpreted this rule to apply only to domestic arbitrations (i.e., disputes located in New York
and that do not involve foreign persons as parties). The New York courts concluded that
the New York Convention's purpose of minimizing uncertainty regarding enforcing arbi-
tration agreements would be undermined by permitting attachment and judicial proceed-




75. Impregilo, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/3, 312.
76. See N.Y C.L.P.R. § 7502(c) (McKinney 2005). Though entitled provisional remedies, CPLR section
7502(c) refers only to applications for orders of attachment or for a preliminary injunction. See also HSBC
Bank USA v. Nat'l Equity Corp, 279 A.D.2d 251 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (holding that if the parties specifically
agree that other forms of provisional relief may be sought, a court can grant such relief).
77. See N.Y C.L.P.R. § 7502.
78. See, e.g., Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, SA, 442 N.E.2d 1239, 1245-47 (N.Y. 1982). Although
predating the enactment of section 7502(c), Cooper's reasoning has been relied upon in decisions that section
7502(c) only applies to domestic arbitrations. See Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 139 A.D.2d
323 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). Notably, such an approach has not been adopted by other jurisdictions, including
New York federal courts. See Borden, Inc. v. Meji Milk Prods. Co., 919 E2d 822, 826 (2d Cir. 1990)
("[e]ntertaining an application for such a remedy, moreover, is not precluded by the Convention but rather is
consistent with its provisions and its spirit").
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Since the enactment of CPLR section 7502(c), experts have argued that this narrow
interpretation did not further the interests of the New York Convention but instead led to
hollow arbitral victories.7 9 As a practical matter, many foreign jurisdictions (including other
states such as California, Connecticut, and New Jersey) do provide these types of remedies.
Therefore, it was argued that New York citizens involved in international business would
be severely prejudiced because they are subject to these types of procedures in foreign
jurisdictions, but are unable to invoke them within their own jurisdiction.Io Moreover, the
arbitral tribunal is not a legitimate substitute for court intervention because the tribunal is
typically not empanelled during the period when provisional relief is most often necessary,
and the tribunal often lacks sufficient power to craft suitable relief because, among other
reasons, they have no authority over non-parties.
Accordingly, twenty years after its initial enactment, CPLR section 7502(c) was amended
to permit courts to entertain applications for provisional remedies regardless of whether
the arbitration is pending or about to be commenced "inside or outside the state, whether
or not it is subject to the [New York Convention]."'1 The amendment further provides that
any such relief will be voided where the arbitration is not commenced within thirty days,
although the court is empowered to expand the thirty day time period for good cause. This
latter rule also adds a penalty-type clause for failing to commence the proceeding within
the set time frame by awarding costs, including attorney's fees, to the respondent.
The amendment did not alter the procedures or standards applicable to grants of relief.
Parties are still required to file a special proceeding with the supreme court in the country
where the arbitration is pending, and if an arbitration has not been commenced, then in
the venue specified by the CPLR. Interestingly, neither the amendment itself nor the leg-
islative reports accompanying the bill addresses and/or resolves the other open issue with
respect to section 7502 (c). Specifically, New York courts have differed as to whether a party
needs only to meet the "rendered inadequate" standard provided for in the law or whether
they must also satisfy the other equitable considerations typically applied to this type of
relief (i.e., (i) irreparable harm; (ii) likely success on the merits; and (iii) balance of equities
in their favor) that have their source elsewhere in the CPLR.s2 Accordingly, this will remain
an open question for those involved in either domestic or international arbitrations in New
York.
79. S. 4837, Comm. On Civil Practices and Rules (N.Y. 2005), available athttp://www.nysba.org/nysbainfo/
committees/cplr/rpt05-06/S4837rpt.pdf.
80. JOINT REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES COMMITTEE AND COMMITTEE ON ARBI-
TRATION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CmTY OF NEW YoRK, 1-2 (2005), available at http.J/www.
abcny.org/pdf/report/international-arb-rpt-on-equit-remedies.pdf (regarding amendment of N.Y. CPLR
section 7502 (c) Permit Attachments and Preliminary Injunctions in Connection with National and Interna-
tional Arbitrations Joint Report).
81. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7502(c).
82. But see Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Starr Technical Risks Agency, Inc., No. 600263/06, 2006 WL
304746, at *3 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 8, 2006).
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